Report: UWS Crash Blamed on Miscommunication Not Mechanical Failure

The crash at the W. 96th St. station that snarled subway traffic on the west side for several days in early January was blamed on miscommunication between a flagman and a supervisor and emergency brakes that were cut to allow the disabled train so other trains could ease past it.

It started when an unruly passenger pulled five emergency brakes, according to a preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board, released on Jan,. 25 which found miscommunication between MTA workers along with poor systems procedures caused the crash. Mechanical failure was ruled out.

The USW crash on Jan. 4 was unfortunately not an isolated incident. In the last two months, New York’s subways have seen three accidents happen, an unusual chain of events. On November 29th, a subway flagman was killed, when he was dragged under a train near Herald Square; that was followed on January 5th when an empty out-of-service subway train and a #1 local train with several hundred passengers on board collided at a slow speed, injuring more than two dozen people; lastly, on January 10th, a B train derailed in Brooklyn.

The event on January 4 tied up West Side 1/2/3 subway lines for the better part of four days.

In its preliminary report released on Jan. 25, the NTSB determined that an unruly passenger aboard the northbound #1 train pulled five emergency cords on the first five cars of that train. The motorman then pulled the train to W. 79th Street and offloaded all passengers. An NYC Transit railcar inspector arrived there, but could not reset the brakes. In less than an hour after the problem started, at 3:00 p.m., this train collided with a northbound #1 train that was using the express track to 96th Street to go around the now out of service train with bad brakes.

That train then overran a red signal, and collided with the other train. The upshot? A total of five Subway cars on the two trains were derailed, and 25 passengers and crew suffered minor injuries.

A cascading series of events and miscommunications led to the derailment, the NTSB found. While at 79th Street, the NYC Transit operations control center instructed the railcar inspector to cut out the brakes and traction motors on the five railcars in the front portion of the train so it could be operated, with the operator instructed to move the out-of-service train to a rail yard for repairs.

After the railcar inspector performed the brake cut-out, the disabled train left 79th Street Station at a very slow speed, northbound on the local track toward 96th Street Station. Notably, with the brakes cut out in the first five cars, the transit system supervisor was operating the controls of the sixth railcar. A flagger at the front of the first car, was communicating with the supervisor to operate the train.

Near 96th Street, the flagger noted in interviews with the NTSB, he lost radio communications with the transit system supervisor in the sixth car. The supervisor did not receive the flagger’s instruction to stop, the train then passed by a red signal requiring a stop at the end of the 96th St. Station platform, and the collision occurred. Ironically, the track in the area was equipped with trip-stops, which activate a train’s emergency brakes if the train passes through a signal requiring a stop. Because the brakes on the first five railcars had already been cut out, emergency brakes could not be activated by the trip-stop.

To aid in the inquiry, , NTSB investigators requested security camera images and radio audio recordings; reviewed signal logs; reviewed NYCT operating procedures; conducted sight distance observations; inspected both trains and tested the brakes on the last five railcars of the out-of-service train, and tested the that trains portable radios used on that train. Neither train was equipped with event recorders, cameras, or other recording devices, which are common on Amtrak and commuter trains.

Future investigative activity on this accident will focus on NYCT’s operating procedures when moving bad order cars, radio communication procedures, mechanical procedures when placing a revenue train in bad order status, and the lack of federal requirements for railcar event recorders on FTA regulated properties.

Following the release of the report on Jan. 25, NYC Transit President Richard Davey said he agreed with the findings of the initial NTSB report.

At one point during the afternoon press conference, Davey stated “I have complete faith in the system,” during one reporters question. He mentioned that radio issues within the subway system happened on average up to 12 times per week.

He referred to the person or persons that had pulled the five emergency cords as “vandals.” He noted that procurement for new subway car inward and outward front end cameras will be standard issue in new cars. The agency will be putting out an RFP for forward facing cameras for track intrusions such as trespassers, shopping carts and other objects.

When another reporter queried about the impact of the NTSB report, Davey felt that that Agency, staffed by professionals, will recommend how to improve NYC Transit.

Towards the end of the 23-minute briefing, he revealed that the first of the new R-211 trains with no end doors for subway riders to negotiate, will be placed in service in the next few weeks. With some controversy about beginning operations just on local tracks, Davey stated that the cars were designed for express train operation and will be running that way in the near future.